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International Relations 101 (#17): The Algebraic Bargaining Model of War
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William Spaniel: International Relations 101 - International Relations 101 (#17): The Algebraic Bargaining Model of War

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Download chapter two of The Rationality of War for free: https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/rationality-of-war-chapter-2.pdf Buy The Rationality of War on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Game-Theory-101-Rationality-War/dp/1500685658/ http://gametheory101.com/courses/international-relations-101/ Can we show that there generally exists a settlement that two sides mutually prefer to war? The answer is yes. This video proves the assertion using the algebraic crisis bargaining model. Next time, we will interpret the results using a geometric model. You can read more about this proof in the following article: http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/fearon-io1995v49n3.pdf

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