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Claire Tomlin, UC Berkeley May 27, 2022 One of the biggest challenges in the design of autonomous systems is to effectively predict what other agents will do. Reachable sets computed using dynamic game formulations can be used to characterize safe states and maneuvers, yet these have typically been based on the assumption that other agents take their most unsafe actions. In this talk, we explore how this worst case assumption may be relaxed. We present both game-theoretic motion planning results which use feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, and behavioral models with parameters learned in real time, to represent interaction between agents. We demonstrate our results on both simulations and robotic experiments of multiple vehicle scenarios. More about the speaker: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tomlin/ Learn more about Stanford's Robotics and Autonomous Systems Graduate Program: https://online.stanford.edu/programs/robotics-and-autonomous-systems-graduate-program
