Game Theory 101 Full Course - Game Theory 101 (#83): Single Raise Poker

gametheory101.com This lecture explores a very simple game of poker, where one player either bets or folds, and the other player calls or folds in response to a bet. It then explains why there are no pooling or separating equilibria before solving for the semi-separating equilibrium. There are two main takeaways. First, semi-separating equilibria are essentially bluffs. Weak types sometimes try to pretend to be strong, and sometimes they just wave a white flag. The opponent sometimes calls what it suspects are bluffs, which disinecentivizes the weak type from bluffing too much. Second, poker is a very complicated game, even in this simple form. Although one might have an intuitive sense about whether players should choose pure strategies or mix, the exact mixing probabilities are not obvious from the start. The levels of complication grow exponentially with more traditional poker games.